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Money Illusion and its Implication on Unemployment
Abstract
The paper discusses the implication of money illusion on persistent unemployment. A particular form of
money illusion is assumed and this is modeled into the efficiency wage theory while separating the analysis
into nominal and real frames. The model shows that the level of unemployment in the nominal and the real
frame are likely to be different and that the government has an incentive to provide a signaling mechanism to
the workers to reduce unemployment levels. Additionally, the government is shown to have an incentive to
announce unemployment rates.
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1 Introduction
Economists have made many attempts to explain the existence of persistent unemployment.
Long term unemployment is usually seen as the result of one or many labour market failures
resulting in some stickiness of wages. Generally, the real wage is believed to be approximately
procyclical and in addition, shifts in the labour demand are said to lead to a large shift in
employment in the short run, but only a small movement in real wage (see: Geary and
Kennan, 1982; Solon, Robert and Parker, 1994). In the long run, however, unemployment
is said to have no trend (Romer, 2006).
One idea that is lacking in literature is the possibility that money illusion may be a cause
of this market failure. I deﬁne money illusion as the "tendency to think in terms of nominal
rather than real monetary values," following Shaﬁr, Diamond and Tversky (1997).1 This
gap in the subject is not surprising since it is widely perceived that the concept of money
illusion violates the assumption of rationality; a somewhat dangerous stand for economists
to take.2 To quote Tobin (1972); “An economic theorist can, of course, commit no greater
crime than to assume money illusion.” Subsequently, many theories have been constructed
to account for the consequences of money illusion while ignoring the very concept.3
Shaﬁr, Diamond and Tversky (1997) highlight the need for theories to account for money
illusion in many parts of economics by presenting results from a survey designed to capture
the psychology behind the decision making process, speciﬁcally looking at framing eﬀects.4
Their results show that agents make systematic mistakes and use both real and nominal
frames when presented with an economic problem, a view also supported by Blinder and
Choi (1990, pp. 1009). They suggest that people choose to work in nominal values “because
it is salient, easy to gauge . . . [and it is often a] reasonable estimate of real worth.” Moreover,
they suggest that by modelling the consequences of money illusion into existing models, its
eﬀect can be studied using framework based on rational agents.5 This paper takes a similar
approach to Shaﬁr et al. (1997) and extend the eﬃciency wage theory to account for money
illusion and studies the implications.
One school of thought to explain the existence of residual unemployment was initially
proposed by Solow (1979); the eﬃciency wage theory in which he argued that the productiv-
ity of a worker is aﬀected by the amount of eﬀort that he puts in, which in turn is determined
by the real wage he is paid. Since, many have extended this idea, each with varying reasons
behind the relationship between wage and productivity. The two notable models are the
shirking model by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and the fair wage eﬀort hypothesis by Akerlof
and Yellen (1990).
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) proposed that workers may shirk if there is no possibility
of punishment, which is the case under perfect labour market (as all wages are equal and
workers are able to obtain another job immediately even when ﬁred). They postulate that
ﬁrms pay wages above the market clearing level in order to deter workers from shirking
1One of the few studies which look into the eﬀect of money illusion (though not speciﬁcally on unem-
ployment) is by Fehr and Tyran (2001) in which they show that money illusion may be the cause of price
rigidity in the economy.
2See Hammond (1997) for a discussion on rationality.
3For example, Lucas (1972) created a model which allows rational agents to make mistakes similar in
cause to money illusion.
4Clearly, an economist need to be speculative of results from a survey, but it is hard to argue against
their ﬁndings in terms of natural human behaviour.
5As an illustration and extension to their empirical study, they incorporate nominal wage history into
the eﬃciency wage model by Solow (1979).
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and these higher wages imply that unemployment will exist in the economy. However,
the model is unable to explain the fact that the unemployment rate stays constant even
under technological or population growth. Additionally, it cannot produce low real wage
variation and high employment variation seen in empirical data (see: Strand, 1992; Gomme,
1999).6 In order to eliminate the long run decreasing trend predicted by the model, Phelps
(1994) and Brecher et al. (2002) introduced the idea that households save optimally which
allows the unemployment rate to be constant even when there is technological progress.
However, as Alexopoulos (2003) highlights, their models fail to account for the variations
in the real wage and employment. Alternatively, Burnside et al. (2000), Alexopoulos (2001)
and Felices (2001) complemented the shirking model by introducing monetary punishments
for workers who shirk to account for the aforementioned variations. It is diﬃcult to criticise
the performance of these models in terms of their predictions of unemployment behaviour,
however, the idea that wage is determined to deter workers from shirking is not concretely
supported by empirical data (see; Blinder and Choi, 1990).
In contrast to the shirking model, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) found motivation for their
fair wage eﬀort hypothesis in theories from sociology and psychology and succeeded in
providing concrete evidence for their idea.7 The model assumes that workers have a concept
of a fair wage and if they are paid less, they provide proportionately less eﬀort to spite
their employers. The model segregates the labour force into skilled and unskilled workers
and they ﬁnd that the eﬀect of a productivity increase on unemployment is opposite in
each group. Thus, an equal increase in productivity for both groups causes no change in
unemployment providing an explanation for the lack of long run trends in the unemployment
rate. Furthermore, by assuming non-instantaneous adjustment of workers’ perception of the
fair wage, the model can produce cyclical variation in the unemployment rate. However,
the exact type of cyclicality is ambiguous.
The inherent problem with unemployment theories is the fact that they make similar
predictions and thus empirical studies can only distinguish diﬀerent models imperfectly.
Consequently, it is extremely diﬃcult to prove that one theory rules over all else. In this
way, there is a need for another method of evaluating various models. One way in which
this can be done is to look at the foundations of the models; for example, by considering
the validity of the assumptions of the model. In this regard, the fair wage eﬀort hypothesis
can be seen to be a better model than the shirking model.
Economic theorists often run the risk of thinking in an overly hypothesised world. Recent
literature on experimental and behavioural economics tries to overcome this weakness and
can be seen as a natural extension to the conventional method of developing models. By
ensuring the robustness of the motivations behind economic models, one may be able to
reduce the danger of over-thinking.
It is diﬃcult to argue against the existence of money illusion among economic agents
as shown by Shaﬁr et al. (1997). Thus, the study of money illusion with respect to un-
employment can be seen to have a concrete foundation. In the next section, I discuss the
current understanding and behaviour of unemployment. In section 2, I explain the concept
of money illusion and in section 3, I develop the eﬃciency wage model with money illusion.
Finally, in the last section, I discuss the implications of the model, its weaknesses as well as
possible extensions.
6Yellen (1984) and Romer (2006) note a problem with using simple wage schemes in the model. Speciﬁ-
cally, they note that using more ingenious contracts such as job selling or bonding can reduce or eliminate
involuntary unemployment. Thus, all shirking models suﬀer from this problem.
7Namely: equity theory, relative deprivation theory and social exchange theory.
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2 Persistent Unemployment
2.1 What causes Persistent Unemployment?
The existence of persistent unemployment in the labour market is a result of ineﬃciency.
In other words, the labour market may not be perfectly competitive and thus the demand
for labour and the supply of labour cannot be matched by itself. The tendency is that
the market is left with excess supply of labour; that is, unemployment. Clearly, there are
demand or supply factors which cause this mismatch.
Recall that the price of the labour is the wage. The traditional view is that the workers
and the ﬁrms calculate their supply and demand for labour using the real wage.8 This
stems from the assumption of rationality where agents are assumed to know everything that
they could know about the current market. Following this view, the existence of persistent
unemployment implies that the real wage is somehow sticky; it does not adjust fully to match
demand and supply. Thus, the explanation for the existence of persistent unemployment is
analogous to the explanation of real wage stickiness. In this way, the existence of persistent
unemployment contradicts the classical dichotomy and thus when analysing, both real as
well as nominal economic variables must be considered.
2.2 Stylised Facts about Unemployment
In order to evaluate the accuracy of models for persistent unemployment, it is essential to
identify the behaviour of unemployment and the real wage. One observation is that, in the
short run, shifts in labour demand lead to large movements in unemployment but only small
changes in the real wage. In other words, labour supply is elastic in the short run. However,
in the long run, the shifts in labour demand fall almost entirely on the real wage; that is,
labour supply is inelastic in the long run (Romer, 2006). In addition, unemployment level
does not seem to follow any trend in the long run.
Geary and Kennan (1982) found that the real wage was approximately acyclical or
slightly procyclical using aggregate data. However, when composition bias is accounted
for in the data, Solon, Robert and Parker (1994) found that the real wage (in the US
between 1967-87) was more procyclical than previously thought, possibly supporting the
New Keynesian model of sticky prices for aggregate supply.9 However, in the end, they
concluded that their ﬁndings do not necessarily support the New Keynesian model, which
subsequently implies that non-Walrasian features of the labour market may be important
in explaining the movement of quantity of labour and real wages.
3 Money Illusion
Money illusion can ultimately be seen as the violation of the assumption of homogeneity of
degree zero in utility functions with nominal prices (Leontief, 1936). More generally, it can
be seen as an example of framing eﬀect where agents make diﬀerent decisions depending on
whether they are given nominal or real prices/wages.
8Other factors may be included in the decision making process such as beneﬁts and health insurance,
but for the sake of simplicity I assume that wage is the only concern.
9It can be assumed that employment for low-skilled workers is more cyclical and thus they account for a
large proportion of employed individuals in booms than in recessions. Consequently, examining aggregate
data is likely to understate the extent of procyclical movements; this is the composition bias.
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As argued by Fehr and Tyran (2001); Shaﬁr et al. (1997), the fact that people often take
the nominal wage as a proxy for real wage is natural in the sense that people are ordinarily
dealing with money and thus are unaccustomed to working under the real price/wage rep-
resentation. Clearly, problems occur when price level is changing. Agents may be making
rational decisions in nominal terms but strictly speaking, agents may be irrational as they
should base their decision on real variables. At ﬁrst sight, it might seem diﬃcult to model
money illusion into conventional economic theory as it seems to require a new notion of
rationality, but it can be done by separating the analysis into real and nominal frames then
assuming a particular form of money illusion.
To demonstrate, assume the following form of money illusion. Firms are rational; that
is, they base their decision on the real wage.10 However, assume that workers base their
decisions on the nominal wage alone. A possible rationale behind this is that it is costly to
calculate the real wage, which require the knowledge of the past, current and future price
levels; consequently ﬁrms which incur greater losses from making mistakes (as workers make
individual decisions) use real wage whereas individuals workers base their decisions only on
nominal wage.11 Recall the ordinary relationship between the real and nominal wage,
W
P
= ω,
where W is the nominal wage, P is the price level and ω is the real wage. If the economy
exhibits inﬂation then this implies ω < W . Consequently, if workers were solely interested in
the nominal wage then conventional theory, which uses the real wage, would underestimate
the labour supply. This should pose a suﬃcient case for money illusion to be incorporated
into unemployment theories.
In order to model the previous situation formally, suppose that there is no direct rela-
tionship between the real and the nominal wage and that they are completely independent
of each other, at least for workers. Wage can then be deﬁned as
wˆ = θW + (1− θ)ω, (1)
where
θ =
{
1
0
for workers
for ﬁrms.
(1) is the form of money illusion assumed throughout the paper and implies that workers
are unable to convert nominal wage into real wage and vice versa.
In the next section, the eﬃciency wage model by Solow (1979) is extended using the
relation in (1) because of two reasons: its ability to explain the behaviour of persistent
unemployment and its simplicity.12 Solow’s model can be extended to account for wage
10I assume that ﬁrms can readily transform real terms into nominal terms and vice versa.
11Shaﬁr et al. (1997) show that both ﬁrms and workers may be under money illusion. However, the
representative ﬁrms were relatively small in size and it is natural to assume that large corporations would
use real variables instead of nominal as losses for them from making mistakes are likely to be large.
12I use the conventional method of maximisation for optimising actions of agents. One might consider
this contradictory because of the implication of money illusion on the concept of rationality. However, I
postulate that workers are rational given the information available to them. In other words, I assume that
they do not have the information to be able to calculate the real wage thus justifying my use of conventional
maximisation method.
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stickiness and a lack of long run trend in the unemployment.13 In addition, the model need
not require the use of a game between ﬁrms and workers.
The eﬃciency wage model assumes that individual labour supply is inelastic at unity.
Consequently, labour supply is constant regardless of whether workers use nominal or real
wage level. However, in order to use the model to account for the eﬀect of money illusion,
I assume that the labour supply may not be inelastic, at least with respect to nominal
wages. Given that workers make decisions solely based on the nominal wage, I can then
suppose a situation where labour supply is inelastic with respect to real wages but elastic
with respect to nominal wages. In such a case, it is possible that labour demand and labour
supply match in nominal wages even when there is unemployment given by the demand
and the supply in real wages which is ﬁxed (at the eﬃciency wage level) as shown in Figure
1. This suggests the idea that persistent unemployment may be an unavoidable result of
heterogeneous agents working in nominal or real terms. However, the situation described
in Figure 1 is a particular case; it is more likely that there will be unemployment in both
nominal and real labour market. In this case, unemployment is caused not only by money
illusion and the eﬃciency wage but by other factors that aﬀect both frames.
Figure 1: Implication of Money Illusion on Traditional Eﬃciency Wage Theory.
13See Appendix 1.
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4 Eﬃciency Wage Theory with Money Illusion
In the previous section, I discussed the potential for money illusion to help explain persistent
unemployment. In this section, I develop a more rigorous model based on the eﬃciency wage
model by Solow (1979). For reference, The traditional eﬃciency wage model is exposed in
Appendix 1.14
4.1 Assumptions
In the model, some of the assumptions from the traditional eﬃciency wage theory still hold.
Speciﬁcally: I is the number of homogeneous ﬁrms with L number of homogeneous workers
willing to work, and output price at unity.
Money illusion is modelled into the eﬃciency wage model by implicitly assuming the
nominal wage-real wage relationship given by (1). In words, ﬁrms know both the nominal
and the real wage, but workers only know the nominal wage and do not have the ability to
calculate the real wage.
Assume that the eﬀort function is a logistic function which is convex initially but concave
after the point of inﬂexion. In other words, I suppose worker eﬀort to exhibit increasing
returns to wages until what the worker considers a fair wage is reached, after which I expect
worker eﬀort to exhibit diminishing returns. This is intuitive; a small increase from zero
nominal wage is unlikely to convince a worker to give any eﬀort but as wage converges to
the perceived fair wage they expect that higher eﬀort will induce ﬁrms to give them a higher
wage. After this fair wage is reached, workers are content knowing that any further increase
in eﬀort is unlikely to lead to a rise in the wage.15 Given a logistic eﬀort function, the point
of inﬂexion is the perceived fair wage by workers.
The value of nominal wage may vary greatly thus I will use the normalised nominal wage
W˜ deﬁned as
W˜ =
W
W −W ∈ (0, 1) , (2)
where W −W is the range of possible nominal wage. Notice that with strictly monotonic
production function, nominal wage transformation given in (2) will not aﬀect the maxima
of the proﬁt maximisation problem for the ﬁrm.16
The generalised logistic eﬀort function g
(
W˜
)
is given by
g
(
W˜
)
= A+
K −A(
1 +Qe−B(W˜−M)
) 1
v
, (3)
where
A Lower asymptote; equals to zero.
K Upper asymptote; determines the productive diﬀerence between
the amount of eﬀective and ordinary labour.
14The reference is taken from Romer (2006).
15Notice that this is a generalisation of the eﬀort function given in Akerlof and Yellen (1990), where they
assume workers provide no extra eﬀort above the fair wage and provides proportionately less eﬀort below
the fair wage to spite their employer.
16Production function is assumed to be concave and at least twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
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B Growth rate; adjusted appropriately with the value of K.17
v Aﬀects near which asymptote the point of inﬂexion (fair wage
eﬀort) lies given positive value.
M Determines where the fair wage lies.
Q Equals g (0).
In order to obtain the result that the ﬁrms pay nominal wage above the perfect labour
market case, the point of inﬂexion must lie above 1 where the amount of eﬀective labour
and the ordinary labour are equal. For simplicity, we let v = 1 and K > 2; that is, the
fair wage is at where W˜ = 1/2 and the fair wage eﬀort lies at K/2 > 1 implying that the
ﬁrms have the incentive to pay above the perfect market case. Letting gN denote the eﬀort
function with respect to nominal wage, then
gN
(
W˜
)
=
K
1 + e−B(W˜−0.5)
∈ (0,K) . (4)
Additionally, assume that the eﬀort function with respect to real wage gR(·) is always equal
to one; that is, the amount of eﬀective labour is equal to the amount of ordinary labour
whatever the real wage may be (following the standard eﬃciency wage model).
Let LSN and L
S
R be individual labour supplies in terms of nominal wage and real wage,
respectively. Assume that LSR is given by
LSR (ω) = 1.
In words, the individual labour supply with respect to real wages is assumed to be inelastic
at unity (the same as in the traditional eﬃciency wage theory). For simplicity, assume
LSN is linear and worker supplies zero units of labour at wage levels below the reservation
normalised wage w˜ ≥ 0:18
LSN
(
W˜
)
= w˜ +DW˜ ∈ [0, 1] . (5)
From equation (5), D is the extent to which a given change in the nominal wage aﬀects
labour supply. However, it is possible to let D be a signal that the workers receive with the
wage, independent of the wage. For now, D is assumed to be a ﬁxed constant. By relaxing
this assumption, it is possible to obtain a situation in which there is always an equilibrium
in the nominal labour market but disequilibrium in the real labour market.
4.2 The Model
Consider the proﬁt maximisation problem of a representative ﬁrm:
max
W˜ ,L
F
[
g
(
W˜
)
L
]
− ωL, (6)
where F (·) is a concave, at least twice continuously diﬀerential production function, g
(
W˜
)
is the eﬀort function given in (4) and L is the amount of labour the ﬁrm hires.19 Recall
17This is so that the eﬀort function reaches suﬃciently close to the asymptotes in W˜ ∈ (0, 1).
18Non-linear labour supply function with respect to nominal wage may be used instead. However, this
also means that the signal, D, would also have to be non-linear and thus labour supply is assumed to be
linear in this case.
19Output price is assumed to be exogenous and at unity for simplicity. This is because the market demand
for the product is ignored in this model. Notice that the price level is not determined by the unit pricing as
this can change over time (again, not modelled here).
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the assumption that ﬁrms can readily convert between nominal wage and real wage thus (6)
becomes
max
W,L
F
[
g
(
W˜
)
L
]
− W˜
P
L.
Solving gives
W˜g′
(
W˜
)
g
(
W˜
) = 1. (7)
(7) is simply the Solow condition in terms of the normalised nominal wage and determines
the equilibrium nominal wage. Given the eﬀort function in (4), the Solow condition in (7)
implies that the following must hold
e−B(W˜−0.5)
(
BW˜ − 1
)
= 1. (8)
The solution to (8) is the eﬃciency wage. It can be seen graphically that for reasonable
values of B and K, equation (8) has a solution in (0.5, 1) as one expects.20 The equation
also has another solution closer to zero which can be ignored as the fair wage is ﬁxed to be
1/2 in the model.
Note that the labour demand LDN at the normalised eﬃciency nominal wage W˜
∗ is given
by
LDN
(
W˜ ∗
)
= g
(
W˜ ∗
)
F ′
[
g
(
W˜ ∗
)
L
]
.
In addition, the labour demand LDR at the normalised eﬃciency real wage ω˜
∗ is given by
LDR (ω˜
∗) = g (ω˜∗)F ′ [g (ω˜∗)L]
and the two are equal in value. The level of unemployment in the real labour market UR is
UR (ω˜
∗) = LSR (ω˜
∗)L− LDR (ω˜∗) I
= L− LDN
(
W˜ ∗
)
I.
The model in the real frame is equivalent to the ordinary eﬃciency wage theory.
Alternatively, the level of unemployment in the nominal labour market UN is
UN
(
W˜ ∗
)
= LSN
(
W˜ ∗
)
L− LDN
(
W˜ ∗
)
I.
Given that LSN has the range [0, 1] then UR ≥ UN .
4.3 A Simple Extension
Previously, it was assumed that the coeﬃcient on the normalised nominal wage in the
individual labour supply function was a constant; that is, D was exogenous in (5). However,
consider the case when D is determined by a signal sent out to the workers along with the
nominal wage oﬀer. Suppose the signal was an indication as to how fair the wage oﬀered
by the ﬁrms were from a third-party who is indiﬀerent between the two types of agents.21
20See Appendix 3 for the graph. Appropriate value of B when K is between 2 and 4 is about 10. A higher
value of K requires a higher value of B.
21Notice that a fairer wage would imply a lower value of D.
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The signal can then alter the preference of the workers such that there is no unemployment
in the nominal frame; by setting D such that
LSN
(
W˜ ∗
)
L = LDN
(
W˜ ∗
)
I
⇔ UN
(
W˜ ∗
)
= 0.
This implies that there is an incentive for the government to provide the labour market with
a signalling mechanism which could eliminate unemployment, at least in the nominal frame.
5 Evaluation of the Model
5.1 Implications
The similarity between the Solow condition from the ordinary eﬃciency wage theory and
(7) is unsurprising given that money illusion amongst workers implies that only the nominal
wage is relevant for workers. In words, ﬁrms no longer minimise the real labour cost per
eﬃciency unit but nominal labour cost per eﬃciency unit.22
Note that the inability of workers to calculate the real wage means that the ﬁrms could
extract more surplus from the workers. The representative ﬁrm employs a certain amount
of eﬀective labour at a given nominal wage, however, it only has to pay that nominal wage
to the workers; a number smaller than the amount of eﬀective labour. Furthermore, as the
ﬁrm can readily convert between the nominal and real wage, the cost of employment of a
worker is ω. Given P > 1, this gives the ﬁrm beneﬁts from being able to control eﬀort at
an even lower nominal wage than in the case without money illusion.
The eﬃciency wage solution from (8) does not involveK, which determines the maximum
diﬀerence between eﬀective labour force and the number of workers. However, recall that
the value of B is partially dependent on the value of K thus we get the intuitive result that
a higher value of K (that is, higher potential productivity) leads to a lower eﬃciency wage;
workers who return greater eﬀort given a nominal wage level require lower nominal wage
level to achieve the optimal outcome for the ﬁrm.23
The model in section 4.2 suggests that there will be unemployment in both the real and
nominal frame but in most cases, unemployment will be higher in the real frame. This
discrepancy in the level of unemployment in the two frames implies that money illusion can
indeed cause unemployment in the economy. Furthermore, given that this eﬀect is persistent
over time, I conclude that money illusion is one of the causes of persistent unemployment.
In addition, the overlapping level of unemployment in the two frames is likely to be caused
by factors which aﬀect both the real and the nominal frames.
The simple extension provided in section 4.3 suggests that there is an incentive for a third-
party (most likely the government) to provide workers with a signal to indicate the fairness
of the wage oﬀered by the ﬁrms. Such a mechanism can eliminate unemployment in the
nominal frame, however, the level in the real frame would remain unchanged. The question
remains whether the government would have the incentive to create such a mechanism as it
will not lead to a reduction in the level of unemployment in the real frame. It can be shown,
however, that the government indeed has the incentive to provide the signalling mechanism.
22From the perspective of the ﬁrm, the two are equivalent.
23See Appendix 3 for the graph.
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Assume heterogeneous workers where some have the ability to convert between the nom-
inal wages and the real wages. In addition, suppose a proportion p of workers are able to
calculate the real wage. Previous assumption of inelastic labour supply with respect to real
wage was based on the fact that workers were unable to calculate the real wage. Hence, it is
reasonable to think that for p proportion of workers, labour supply is elastic with respect to
real wage and denote this function LSR′ (ω˜).
24 The level of unemployment in the real labour
market is then
UR (ω˜
∗) =
[
pLSR′ (ω˜)L+ (1− p)LSR (ω˜)
]− LDR (ω˜∗) I
= L− LDN
(
W˜ ∗
)
I.
Thus, the signal can have an eﬀect in the real labour market as LSR′ (ω˜) is aﬀected by the
value of D.
5.2 Announcements of Unemployment Rates
It is shown in the appendix that the eﬃciency wage theory can account for the long run
behaviour of the unemployment level by including the unemployment rate in the eﬀort
function. The intuition is simple; a higher unemployment rate implies higher cost of being
out of work and thus it leads to greater eﬀort given a wage level. Applying this approach to
the model with money illusion requires consideration of whether one uses the nominal or real
unemployment rate; unemployment that exist in nominal and real frames. It is reasonable
to assume that the workers, as they work in nominal terms, can only see the nominal
unemployment rate. However, ﬁrms know both nominal and the real unemployment rates.
Following the convention used already, let uR be the real unemployment rate and uN be the
nominal unemployment rate.
Notice that the ﬁrm always has the incentive to make workers believe that the unemploy-
ment rate is higher as this signiﬁes a costless increase in eﬀective labour for ﬁrms. Workers
will know this and any suggestion made by the ﬁrm about the level of unemployment will
not be credible.
Now consider the following three cases:
Case 1: uR > uN ; workers’ perceived level of unemployment is below that of the level in
the real frame. The ﬁrms will beneﬁt if they could make a credible announcement
to the worker.
Case 2: uR < uN ; workers’ perceived level of unemployment is above that of the level in
the real frame. The ﬁrms have no incentive to correct workers’ belief. It is able
to capture even more of worker surplus. Workers, on the other hand, have an
incentive to deduce the real unemployment rate if only they knew the real wage.
Case 3: uR = uN ; workers’ perceived level of unemployment is the same as that of the
level in the real frame. Optimal.
In cases 1 and 2 (the two most likely cases), either the ﬁrms or the workers have an incentive
to act to improve the situation. One way to correct the diﬀerences is to have a third-party
who is indiﬀerent between the ﬁrm and the worker making credible announcements about the
24In fact, by the assumption of transitivity, labour supply function with respect to real wage must be
convertible to the function with respect to nominal wage and vice versa.
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unemployment rate; for example, the government which is what happens in many countries.
Given these credible announcements, nominal unemployment will converge in the long run to
the real unemployment, while they may be diﬀerent in between announcements. Notice that
having credible announcements may not lead to a more Pareto eﬃcient outcome, instead,
they can be seen to result in a fairer outcome; that is, to negate the consequence of money
illusion on worker surplus.
5.3 Weaknesses & Extensions
The model developed here has inherent weaknesses arising from the use of the eﬃciency
wage theory. However, these may be negligible as empirical evidence seems to support the
existence of eﬃciency wage (see Krueger and Summers, 1988; Cappelli and Chauvin, 1991;
Wadhwani and Wall, 1991). Instead, the weaknesses of the model are likely to arise from the
additional assumptions made. Clearly, it is unreasonable to assume homogeneous ﬁrms and
workers, and the simpliﬁed eﬀort function may not reﬂect the real eﬀort function. However,
the simpliﬁcation is there to make the implications of the model clear. The former problem
can be tackled by generalising the relationship deﬁned in (1); for example, by assuming that
θ may be distributed on some truncated normal distribution. The latter problem can be
solved by further generalisation of the eﬀort function; for example, by assuming v > 1 in
(3). This is likely to have a similar eﬀect to the eﬃciency wage level as changing the values
of K; that closer the point of inﬂexion is to the upper asymptote, the lower the eﬃciency
wage level. One important aspect of this model which needs empirical veriﬁcation is the
labour supply function which assumes that workers change their preferences according to a
signal sent by a neural third party.
Other weaknesses of the model arise from two factors: perfect information for the ﬁrms
and lack of interaction between the two types of agents. The model assumes that the ﬁrms
know the eﬀort function of the workers. In most cases, the ﬁrms will not know the exact
eﬀort function. Note that even if the ﬁrm is uncertain about the eﬀort function, it is unlikely
that this will lead to any signiﬁcant changes in the implication of the model discussed here
except that the possibility to eliminate unemployment in the nominal frame disappears.
The lack of interaction between the ﬁrms and the workers essentially means that the model
does not make use of incomplete information games. It is possible to model the behaviour
of the workers by separating them into two groups. For example, considering one group
as the leaders of a union and the others as its members. In this case, one could make use
of principal-agent games where union members are the principal and the agents are the
union leaders with the assumption of costly calculation of real wages. Furthermore, the
paper did not consider the possibility of learning by the workers after announcements of
unemployment rates by a neutral third party. A richer model would consider the eﬀect that
the announcements may have on the ability for workers to deduce the real wage at a lower
cost.
6 Conclusion
I ﬁrst showed that money illusion should not be feared but instead, embraced into general
economics; money illusion need not lead to an abandonment of traditional economic ap-
proach. I showed that by using the relation given in (1) (that is, a particular form of money
illusion), one can systematically study the eﬀect of money illusion by considering both the
nominal frame and real frame separately.
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I argued that the eﬃciency wage model is a good candidate to explain persistent unem-
ployment and extended this model to incorporate money illusion. By considering the labour
market with respect to nominal wages and real wages separately, I showed that the economy
can be in a situation where there is unemployment in the real market but exhibit market
clearing in the nominal market with the aid of a neutral third party. However, realistically,
unemployment is likely to exist in both frames at diﬀerent levels. The diﬀerence between
the two is the direct consequence of money illusion. Furthermore, I proposed a reason for
why the unemployment rate is usually announced by the government with the suggested
outcome of converging values of real and nominal unemployment rates in the long run.
In the past, money illusion has been largely ignored and there is a lack of study into
the ﬁeld. I support the view held by Shaﬁr et al. (1997), that money illusion can be
systematically studied and introduced an alternative way in which it may be incorporated
into existing models.
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A Appendices
A.1 Traditional Eﬃciency Wage Theory
Based on Romer (2006), chapter 9.
A.1.1 The Model
Assume a large number, I, of homogeneous competitive ﬁrms who are wage-setters in the
labour market. They believe that higher wage induces higher average productivity and thus
they are willing to oﬀer wage above the market clearing level. Additionally, assume that
eﬀort is driven by real wage and the output price is unity. Then the representative ﬁrm’s
maximisation problem is
max
ω,L
F [g (ω)L]− ωL,
where F (·) is the production function, g (·) is the average eﬀort/productivity of workers, L
is the number of workers, and ω is the real wage.25 First order conditions lead to the Solow
condition:
ωg′ (ω)
g (ω)
= 1. (9)
In words, elasticity of eﬀort with respect to wage is unity. The real wage satisfying (9) is
known as the eﬃciency wage. Let ω∗ and L∗ denote the values of wage and labour that
satisfy (9). Given the assumption of identical ﬁrms, the total labour demanded is simply IL∗
and if labour supply (L¯) exceeds this amount then there will be unemployment of amount
L¯− IL∗.
The model is clearly able to predict the existence of unemployment. Furthermore, be-
cause wage is ﬁxed at the eﬃciency wage level, it is unresponsive to demand shifts. Con-
sequently, this can explain why shifts in labour demand lead to large movements in em-
ployment but only small changes in the real wage. Consider the long run implication of
the model; as economy grows, demand for labour increases, however, the real wage remains
constant and therefore unemployment trends downward until it reaches zero. Thus, this
model is unable to explain the behaviour of unemployment in the long run.
A.1.2 The Extended Model
Generalise the eﬀort function to the following
g = g (ω, u) , e1 (·) , e2 (·) > 0,
where u is the unemployment rate. Provided that labour supply is above IL∗, there is
unemployment of amount L¯ − IL∗. Now,consider the long run implication of this model.
As before, with economic growth, unemployment level trends downward. However, because
lower unemployment level has a negative eﬀect on the level of eﬀort, the model can account
for the absence of trends in unemployment in the long run.
The extended model is able to explain the behaviour of unemployment described in the
main text and thus constitutes as a possible candidate for the explanation of the existence
of persistent unemployment.
25e (w)L is the amount of eﬀective labour.
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A.2 Graphical Solution to Eﬃciency Wage
§
A.3 Analysis of Eﬃciency Wage
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